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The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism:
Conflict and Cooperation in an Era of Partisan Polarization

Abstract: A key development during the Obama Administration was the increasing
importance of state attorneys general (AGs) in national policymaking. This article examines the
dual roles that AGs played during the Obama years. The first role was highly contentious, with
Republican AGs leading several multistate challenges to Obama Administration priorities and
successfully limiting Obama’s policy legacy. The second role was more cooperative, involving
increasing coordination between AGs and their federal counterparts in national enforcement
efforts. Relying on case studies in the areas of immigration enforcement, climate change
regulation, and the oversight of for-profit higher education, this article highlights several crucial
trends concerning the activities of these important state-level actors.

Throughout Barack Obama’s presidency, the partisan divides that have been a staple of
contemporary American politics continued to widen. The two parties are further apart
ideologically now than they have been in decades, as both political elites and members of the
mass public have become increasingly polarized (Theriault 2008; Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
Scholars examining these trends in political polarization have noted how they have trickled down
to the states and affected state-level institutions. State legislatures, for example, have become
increasingly polarized in recent years (Shor and McCarty 2011; Jordan and Bowling 2017). This
state-level polarization has contributed to a “fragmented federalism” marked by more
contentious relationships both between states and the federal government as well as among the
states themselves (Bowling and Pickerill 2013).
This article considers how these trends have affected a set of state-level actors who have
gained additional prominence during the Obama years: state attorneys general (AGs). Building
upon their successes during previous administrations, AGs became a more entrenched part of the
national policy landscape during Obama’s presidency. Most prominently, coalitions of mostly
Republican AGs aggressively challenged Obama Administration initiatives such as the Clean
Power Plan, various aspects of the Affordable Care Act, and new rules pertaining to transgender
rights. Many of these efforts successfully limited, delayed, or curtailed Obama’s regulatory
agenda, particularly during his second term. Meanwhile, Democratic AGs used their powers to
try to achieve national policy gains, including through corporate investigations of energy
companies they accused of thwarting efforts to address climate change.
This AG activism reverberated throughout the American political landscape, frequently
sparking partisan responses. Republican and Democratic AGs frequently squared off in court
along partisan lines to oppose their fellow AGs’ efforts. State legislators and governors battled

with their state AGs (who are independently elected in most states) over the right to represent
their states in litigation, and AGs were criticized both for their willingness to bring litigation and
their refusal to defend their state in cases involving hot-button issues such as same-sex marriage,
voter ID laws, and political redistricting (e.g., Jarvis and Blythe 2016). Congress even became
involved in state-level investigations for the first time, with members of Congress going as far as
to issue subpoenas to AGs accused of harassing corporations (Schwartz 2016b).
While this partisan conflict among AGs grew during the Obama Administration, AGs
still engaged in a significant degree of cooperative, bipartisan behavior. AGs worked together on
several investigations of corporate entities throughout this period, including on important antifraud initiatives, crime control, and drug policy. Additionally, from the first weeks of the Obama
presidency, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) signaled that it would seek closer relationships
with its state counterparts to tackle issues of common concern of the federal and state
governments. This led to the creation of new collaborative efforts including the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force, which (among many other efforts) concluded a major $26 billion
settlement with the nation’s five largest mortgage lenders over allegations stemming from the
mortgage crisis.
This article examines both the conflictual and cooperative aspects of AG activities during
Obama’s presidency. It builds upon recent scholarly work exploring the institutional
development of AGs and their increasing prominence in national policymaking. This increasing
prominence in national politics began as early as the 1980s, when groups of AGs began working
cooperatively to solve issues of concern to multiple states. Cornell Clayton noted how the “New
Federalism” of the 1970s and 1980s reshaped the office by thrusting additional responsibilities
on AGs. While AGs were once state-focused actors largely disconnected from one another, AGs

created new mechanisms of interstate collaboration to help them handle their growing role in
national policymaking (Clayton 1994, 542). The crucial breakthrough came in the late 1990s,
when forty-six AGs signed a $206 billion settlement with the tobacco industry that
fundamentally altered tobacco policy and regulation in the United States (Derthick 2012). By
working together across state lines, AGs pooled their resources, provided legal heft to novel legal
arguments, and found success in court against a major industry that private plaintiffs had
unsuccessfully battled for decades.
AGs have since used this cooperative multi-state model to influence national policy in
several other ways. Building upon their tobacco success, entrepreneurial AGs sought to reshape
industry practices in the name of consumer protection (Provost 2003; 2006). Particularly during
the George W. Bush Administration, AGs also became more aggressive in employing multistate
strategies against the federal government. Activist Democratic AGs such as New York’s Eliot
Spitzer led numerous campaigns to prevent attempts at regulatory rollback by federal agencies,
particularly concerning environmental policy (Nolette 2015a). AGs also became among the most
active filers of amicus curiae briefs in federal courts – activity that has become increasingly
partisan since the beginning of the 2000s (Lemos and Quinn 2015). All of this building activity
since the late 1990s set the stage for AGs to be critical players on the national stage during the
Obama Administration.
This activity was made possible in part by Congress’s decision to structure much of the
contemporary regulatory state on the frame of cooperative federalism, thereby granting state and
local governments key roles in the administration of federal policy. States are on the front lines
of implementing much of the American environmental and health care policy regimes, for
example, such as with enforcing clean air standards or administering Medicaid. This choice

required federal and state actors to work together to solve common problems, but it also provided
states additional leverage to pursue their own agendas within these policy regimes and to make
demands on the federal government. Among other things, it led to the creation of new
mechanisms of coordination and compromise among and between levels of government, such as
the rise of negotiated waivers allowing for state-by-state variation in implementation of federal
law (Thompson and Gusmano 2014; Wong 2015).
The increasing institutional resources available to the AGs has also enabled their
activism. In addition to creating new avenues of collaboration amongst themselves, AGs have
been aided by other institutions and actors that have encouraged state litigation. The federal
judiciary, for example, granted states “special solicitude” when determining whether states had
standing to sue, making it easier for AGs to use the courts in challenges to national policy. This
standing doctrine, a key part of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007), offered a hook for AGs to bring challenges to new Obama-era laws and regulations.
At the same time, Congress continued to bolster AG power during the Obama years, providing
AGs additional powers to enforce federal consumer protection laws. State legislatures also
frequently allied with their state’s AGs, providing additional resources and legal authority to
bring lawsuits against corporations and the federal government alike. Meanwhile, ideological
interest groups increasingly viewed AGs as powerful allies, providing strategic and financial
support for multistate AG litigation (Nolette 2014).
This article examines how trends in AG activity that had been building since the late
1990s became an entrenched part of the national policy landscape during Obama’s presidency.
During this time, AGs of both parties fully realized the benefits of collective action, taking
advantage of collaborations amongst themselves – sometimes along partisan lines and other

times on a bipartisan basis – to provide rapid responses to federal actions or corporate activities.
The scope of their collaborations has also encompassed policy areas in which states traditionally
played a smaller role vis-à-vis the federal government, particularly immigration. This increased
coordination has allowed AGs to act quickly as well as provide greater support for novel legal
arguments.
Their efforts reflect their importance as both key veto points and opportunity points in
contemporary American federalism (Wittes and Nivola 2015). On the one hand, their activities
have contributed to national policy “gridlock” by delaying or stopping implementation of federal
laws and regulations. In the last years of the Obama Administration – and first few months of the
Trump Administration – AGs took advantage of the increasing willingness of single federal
district courts to issue national injunctions that blocked policies nationwide (Bray forthcoming).
On the other hand, AGs have used their positions to circumvent gridlock by acting as opportunity
points for policy change when Congress is unwilling or unable to act. Through lawsuits and
settlements with corporate defendants, such as the for-profit education sector discussed in this
article, AGs have shaped the regulatory environment of entire national industries in the absence
of new federal laws or regulations. In this sense, the increasing polarization of state level politics
might open more opportunities for policy change, even as polarization in Congress stymies
lawmaking.
This article proceeds by first examining the trends towards greater conflictual
relationships between the AGs and the federal government as well as among the AGs
themselves. Following an overview of partisan AG-led lawsuits against Obama Administration
policies and the broader trends they highlight, I turn to two case studies illustrating the
contentious side of contemporary AG activism. The first examines Texas v. United States, in

which several Republican AGs successfully halted two centerpieces of President Obama’s
immigration policies. The second explores AGs’ role in climate change policy, including a
multistate AG effort in West Virginia v. EPA that blocked Obama’s efforts to institute stricter
limits on greenhouse gases. While that effort was largely Republican, Democratic AGs used the
powers of their office to begin a novel investigation of ExxonMobil for allegedly interfering with
climate science.
While this illustrates the growth of increasing conflict in AG activism, the next section
considers how important elements of AG activities remain cooperative and bipartisan. Especially
important was the increased use of federal-state enforcement taskforces during the Obama
Administration in which federal and state actors worked together to address common concerns.
Following an overview of this activity, I turn to a case study examining joint federal-state
enforcement actions in the for-profit higher education industry. This highlights a more
cooperative side of the relationship between AGs and their federal counterparts.
Analyzing these trends provides insight into how AGs’ increasingly prominent role on
the national stage both complicates and complements the operation of contemporary national
policy. This role reflects deepening “trickle-down polarization” as partisanship on the national
level has been increasingly reflected in the states, but also highlights that cooperative efforts
aiming to solve shared problems remains possible even in this increasingly polarized era.

POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT IN AG ACTIVITY
As noted above, polarization among AGs has been building since AGs became more
involved in national politics and policy. Shortly after the tobacco litigation, for example, AGs
formed separate partisan organizations that have since become important organizations for

fundraising and strategy development, with the Republican Attorneys General Association
forming in 1999 and the Democratic Attorneys General Association forming in 2002. During the
George W. Bush Administration, AG activism was often driven by Democratic AGs seeking to
fill what they viewed as “regulatory gaps” left open by federal inaction in areas including climate
change, prescription drug regulation, and consumer protection. Prominent Democratic AGs such
as Eliot Spitzer, who was empowered in part because of Wall Street’s presence in New York and
also because of the particularly broad nature of the New York AG’s legal powers, used numerous
innovative legal theories as a method of pushing back on the deregulatory agenda of the Bush
Administration.
With a new Democratic administration entering the White House in 2009, Republican
AGs essentially flipped the script. In a mirror image of Democratic efforts to push back on
deregulatory efforts of the Bush Administration, Republican AGs sought to stymie President
Obama’s regulatory expansions. The key initial collaboration involved working on a potential
challenge to the so-called “Cornhusker Kickback” that was part of the original version of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 While this provision was dropped from the
final legislation, this initial collaboration eventually blossomed into a multistate effort raising
several constitutional challenges to the ACA.2 Among other arguments, the states’ lawsuit
claimed that the Medicaid expansion provision of the ACA violated federalism principles by
essentially forcing the states to go along with a federal program. These arguments ultimately
succeeded in limiting the ACA’s Medicaid expansion by allowing states to opt out of the
expansion, which subsequently set up contentious state-level fights over heath care provision.
The ACA litigation also presaged later AG challenges to other Obama-era policies. To give a

sense of the expansiveness of these multistate AG challenges, Table 1 highlights several of the
most prominent AG-led lawsuits against Obama Administration policies.

[Table 1 about here]

Recent Trends Towards Greater Conflict in AG Activities
The emergence of a distinctly Republican AG activism is perhaps the most prominent
trend in AG activity that emerged during the Obama Administration. This trend contrasts with
the comparatively subdued Republican AG activity during the previous Democratic presidential
administration. Republican AGs attempted few multistate challenges to President Bill Clinton’s
regulatory and legislative program, and even most of these were bipartisan efforts.3 Republican
AGs formed the Republican Attorneys General Association in 1999 largely in response to the
alleged “regulation through litigation” engaged in by liberal AGs; but this organization focused
initially on fundraising goals rather than litigation strategy (Curriden 1999). With a Republican
president subsequently entering office, Republican AGs took a mainly reactive approach,
defending against challenges brought by increasingly aggressive Democratic AGs. Obama’s
presidency provided Republican AGs an opportunity to go on the offensive. Collaboration on
ACA litigation, combined with the 2010 elections that swept a new activist group of
conservative AGs into office, entrenched Republican AGs as a strong force against federal
regulatory expansion.4 In addition to collaborating on direct legal challenges to the Obama
Administration, Republican AGs filed scores of multistate amicus briefs in federal courts
concerning several highly contentious issues and were active in multistate attempts to affect the
regulatory process (Nolette 2014).

Related to the rise of Republican AG activism was a second major trend: deepening
polarization among AGs themselves. As both liberal and conservative AGs have increasingly
used their offices to challenge federal policy, it has spurred AGs on the other side of the partisan
divide to form counter-coalitions directly opposing the efforts of their fellow AGs. During the
ACA litigation, for example, an entirely Democratic coalition of AGs formed to defend the law
in court against the entirely Republican AG coalition challenging it.5 As challenges to Obama’s
policies became regularized, the shape of these partisan coalitions has become quite predictable
and stable. Similar counter-coalitions formed in response to virtually all of major legal lawsuits
initiated by Republican AGs against Obama Administration policies – a divide that also appears
in amicus filings in the Supreme Court (Nolette 2014).
The polarization among the AGs themselves has been accompanied by strengthening
collaborations between AGs and ideological allies both inside and outside government. During
the ACA litigation, for example, AGs worked closely with the National Federation of
Independent Business and other business groups throughout the litigation. These collaborations
included both discussions about legal strategies as well as pooling financial resources allowing
the coalition to hire prominent outside attorneys to direct the lawsuits (Elmore 2011).
Democratic AG coalitions have included similar collaborations with liberal interest groups, such
as environmental and health care advocacy organizations. For example, the 2007 Massachusetts
v. EPA litigation involved close collaboration between the twenty-nine state and interest group
plaintiffs aligned against the EPA in the case. Meanwhile, AGs have increasingly coordinated
with ideological allies within government as well. In several AG-led lawsuits, members of
Congress filed amicus briefs along partisan lines bolstering the arguments made by their statelevel ideological allies. As discussed further below, congressional committees have even gotten

directly involved in state-level investigations, using their subpoena power to advance the goals of
like-minded AGs.
I turn now to a pair of case studies, involving immigration and climate change, that
illustrate the intensification of AG conflict during the Obama Administration. As Table 1
indicates, these areas reflect only two of the many in which AGs led challenges to Obama’s
policies. I focus on immigration and climate change in part because they represent perhaps the
two most important substantive areas of policy in which Obama attempted to use executive
authority to secure significant policy gains even in the face of congressional hostility. That AGs
successfully stymied these crucial aspects of Obama’s legacy is an indication of AGs’
importance in contemporary American politics.
Additionally, both cases are excellent examples of the sorts of novel argumentation that
has become a feature of multistate AG activism. Texas v. United States was the most aggressive
attempt of AGs yet to influence a policy regime not built upon the structure of cooperative
federalism but that had instead been controlled chiefly by the federal government. Relying upon
innovative arguments about why they had standing to challenge the federal government in this
area, Republican AGs ironically paved the way for successful Democratic AG challenges to
immigration orders issues in early part of the Trump Administration. Unlike with immigration
policy, environmental policy has been built upon a frame of cooperative federalism. Yet the
AGs’ climate change litigation illustrates how the cooperative model – by granting states key
roles in national policy regimes – also contributes to partisan conflict as AGs have become more
polarized. Partisan groups of AGs have employed both the veto points and opportunity points
inherent in America’s federal system to both push back on federal policy and try to circumvent
Congress when it declined to create new policies.

Disrupting Federal Executive Action: AGs and Obama’s Immigration Policy
Immigration has been one of the most polarizing issues in American politics over the last
few years, and that polarization has been reflected in AG responses to federal actions concerning
the issue. Opposing coalitions of AGs faced off against each other along partisan lines when the
federal Department of Justice challenged new state laws in Arizona and elsewhere pertaining to
undocumented immigrants (Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 [2012]). Most prominently,
AGs led a major challenge to the Obama Administration’s attempts to achieve changes in the
immigration system through executive actions taken in the absence of new congressional
legislation. This challenge, Texas v. United States, illustrates the emergence of Republican AG
activism and the deepening polarization among AGs. It also demonstrates the AGs’ increasing
involvement in issues, such as immigration, traditionally viewed as within national control.

Obama’s Executive Actions and Subsequent AG Challenges
Texas v. U.S. challenged a series of Obama Administration executive actions following
failed congressional efforts to enact the DREAM Act, legislation that would have allowed
undocumented immigrants to apply for lawful permanent resident status. Two programs were
particularly relevant to the litigation: the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program and the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) initiative. DACA, implemented by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
2012, permitted individuals who first came to the US as children to apply for deferred action
status and employment authorizations for a renewable two-year period. In November 2014, the
DHS announced an expansion of DACA, removing an age cap in the original program that

excluded some older undocumented immigrants and expanded work authorizations from two to
three years. The DHS simultaneously announced the new DAPA program that sought to
indefinitely delay deportation of the undocumented immigrant parents of lawful U.S. citizens and
permanent residents. DAPA, while not granting any new legal status, would effectively allow
approximately four million undocumented immigrants to remain in the country. Both DAPA and
the expanded DACA relied upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by aiming to cut back
on aggressive deportation actions.
Only a few days after the Obama Administration announced both actions, Texas AG
Greg Abbott announced that he was leading a seventeen-state coalition challenging the executive
actions in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The coalition, which soon
expanded to twenty-six states, argued that both directives directly harmed the states by leading to
a “flood of immigration across the Texas-Mexico border.” This, in turn, threatened to bolster
drug cartel activity within Texas and other states and force states to “expend substantial
resources on law enforcement, healthcare, and education.” The authorization of undocumented
immigrants to obtain work permits would also raise additional permit processing costs for the
states, and the grant of deferred action would increase costs relating to issuance of drivers’
licenses to the beneficiaries of the program.6
The plaintiff AGs made two main sets of legal arguments, one constitutional and one
statutory. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the actions violated the Take Care Clause in Article II
of the Constitution because they amounted to changing the law as opposed to simply using
discretion to shape its enforcement. In particular, the AGs pointed to several immigration laws
that they argued placed a mandatory duty on the executive branch to deport individuals not in the
country legally. Furthermore, Congress had already specified a procedure for undocumented

parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents to stay in the United States. Contravening
these congressional procedures, the states argued, was not within the president’s power to
“faithfully execute the law.”7 In addition to this constitutional argument, the AGs argued that the
administration had violated the procedures for creating new rules required by Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). For most rules, the APA requires that the agency provide notice of its
proposed rules and an opportunity for affected parties to comment on them. Because neither
DACA nor DAPA went through this notice-and-comment rulemaking, the states argued, the
agency had illegally sidestepped statutory requirements. The AGs made a substantive APA
argument as well, arguing that even if the Administration had followed the APA’s procedures,
the orders would still be invalid because the DHS’ actions essentially rewrote the law as opposed
to enforcing it.8
Of the twenty AGs involved in the challenge, all but one were Republican.9 The
additional state plaintiffs included the governors of several states whose AG declined to join the
lawsuit. Throughout much of the litigation, this Republican coalition faced off against a sixteenmember all-Democratic AG coalition that defended the Obama Administration’s actions through
amicus curiae filings. Democratic AGs argued that far from hurting states, DACA and DAPA
would actually benefit states by increasing state income tax revenues, improving public safety,
and providing a more secure living situation for resident children of undocumented immigrants.10
Additionally, they argued that several of the alleged harms suffered by states – such as additional
costs accrued because of the issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants – were
self-inflicted since neither federal initiative required states to issues such licenses to
undocumented individuals.11

[Table 2 about here]

The Courts’ Decisions
On February 16, 2015, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction against DAPA
and the expanded DACA, upholding the stay a couple months later. The court rejected the
Obama Administration’s position that both executive actions merely represented the exercise of
the DHS’s broad discretion to implement immigration law. Instead, Obama’s executive actions
were less like administrative discretion and more like a substantive rule that – like most
regulatory changes – must go through the processes established by the APA. While the APA
allows for “general statements of policy” to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking, these
immigration orders spurred a substantive change in existing law, had a binding effect on DHS
practice, and thus were subject to the APA. Because the DHS failed to subject the orders to the
APA, the orders were invalid. (Because the court held that the federal government had violated
the APA’s procedural requirements, the court declined to address the constitutional Article II
arguments.) Enjoining the program was appropriate since “without a preliminary injunction…the
States [would face] the substantially difficult – if not impossible – task of retracting any benefits
or licenses already provided to DAPA beneficiaries. This genie would be impossible to put back
into the bottle” (Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 673 [S.D. Tex. 2015]).
On appeal, a divided three-member panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction on
November 9, 2015. The lengthy decision mirrored much of the District Court’s holding, holding
that the plaintiff states were likely to prevail on their claims that the executive actions improperly
sidestepped the APA’s requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, the majority
went beyond the District Court by also accepting the states’ substantive APA claims and

criticizing the federal government’s interpretation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA). Per the majority, “the INA flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal
aliens as lawfully present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and state
benefits, including work authorization” (Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 184 [5th Cir.
2015]). In short, even if DHS had properly followed the APA’s procedural rules – which the
Fifth Circuit held it did not – the orders would still be invalid because the INA did not provide
DHS the broad authority it claimed when issuing the orders.
The DOJ sought review of this Fifth Circuit panel decision in the Supreme Court, and the
Court granted certiorari not only on the APA issues decided by the lower courts but, intriguingly,
on the Take Care Clause issue as well. This seemingly set the stage for a major decision in the
summer of 2016, but Justice Antonin Scalia’s death only a few weeks after the cert grant cast
doubt on how the Court would proceed. The answer came on June 23, 2016, when the Court, in a
single sentence holding with no reasoning provided, upheld the Fifth Circuit by an equally
divided (four-four) court.
The Supreme Court’s split decision by an eight-member court upheld the District Court’s
original stay of DAPA and the expanded DACA. The Court’s denial of a rehearing on the first
day of its 2016-2017 term effectively put an end to the programs. This was a considerable blow
to Obama’s overall immigration legacy, and ensured that the question of how to handle millions
of undocumented immigrants would be deferred to the Donald Trump Administration. While the
Trump Administration had not as of this writing reversed the programs as he had pledged to do
during the presidential campaign, the new administration’s different approach to immigration
issues appears likely to vindicate the plaintiff AGs’ litigation strategy of forcing delays in policy
implementation.

AG Activism and State Standing
The Texas v. U.S. litigation helps illustrate the polarized nature of AG activism during the
Obama Administration. As they have in numerous policy areas, Republican AGs have harnessed
coordinated strategies, previously used mainly by Democratic AGs during the Bush
Administration, to push back on President Obama’s policies. Moreover, this litigation illustrates
how AGs have increasingly split along partisan lines to face off against one another in court.
Here, as elsewhere, Republican and Democratic AGs formed opposing coalitions either
challenging or supporting federal policy. Among other things, it serves as a reminder that when
“the states” sue it really means that “the AGs” – all with partisan affiliations – are typically the
ones bringing the lawsuits.
One important issue the Supreme Court’s one-sentence decision left unresolved was the
threshold issue of whether AGs had standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s actions in
the first place. This standing issue received a great deal of attention in both lower court cases,
with both courts providing expansive standing for AGs to challenge federal immigration policy
despite the federal government’s traditionally exclusive role over this area. The District Court
devoted a significant portion of its opinion to the issue, holding that the states had demonstrated
concrete harm, that these harms were caused by the federal government’s actions, and that the
harms could be redressed by a favorable court decision (Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 614-644 [S.D. Tex. 2015]).
This was an important holding, not only because it allowed the plaintiff AGs to proceed
to the merits but because it suggested that AGs could rely upon an expansive interpretation of
“concrete” state harms in order to get into court. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was even friendlier

to state standing claims. Relying more heavily on this ground than did the District Court, the
Fifth Circuit held that the states were entitled to “special solicitude” in the court’s standing
analysis. This doctrine had been part of the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision in
2007, which held that a coalition of AGs had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate
greenhouse gases. According to the Massachusetts majority, the states “are not normal litigants
for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction,” since they have “quasi-sovereign” interests in
their territory that can be affected by federal action. Because states surrendered some of their
sovereign prerogatives to the federal government when they joined the union – Massachusetts
cannot invade New York to force the latter to reduce pollution drifting into the former – states
should have additional ability to protect their interests in the courts. The Fifth Circuit applied this
rationale to immigration, holding that “DAPA affects the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by
imposing substantial pressure on them to change their laws, which provide for issuing driver’s
licenses to some aliens and subsidizing those licenses” (Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134,
153 [5th Cir. 2015]).
Since the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, it has not been clear just how far the
“special solitude” rule would stretch. However, the Fifth Circuit’s decision illustrates that the
special solicitude standard is alive and well, providing an additional legal avenue for AGs to
challenge federal policy. In addition to relying on this standard in Texas v. U.S., Republican AGs
used this “special solicitude” standard to argue that they had standing to challenge the Affordable
Care Act, for instance (Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606n5 [E.D. Va. 2010]). More
recently, Democratic AGs relied upon the special solitude standard to challenge President
Trump’s immigration orders.12 In short, this standard has proven to be a source of considerable

leverage for AGs to challenge federal policy – even in areas like immigration law that have
traditionally been controlled by the federal government.

The Expansion of AG Polarization: Climate Change and the AGs
American environmental policy operates as a classic example of cooperative federalism.
Under many key environmental statutes, including the Clean Air Act (CAA), states serve a
primary role in implementing minimum pollution standards set by the federal government. This
approach aims to both harness regulatory power on both levels of government and to reduce a
potentially destructive “race to the bottom” in state environmental standard-setting (Engel 2015).
While this cooperative model has prompted federal and state officials to work together to solve
common concerns, it also opened the door for states to have greater say concerning the shape and
extent of national regulatory policy. The structure of this “cooperative” regulatory regime
provides opportunities for state officials to both work with and push back against federal
approaches in this area.
AGs have taken advantage of this dynamic to emerge as major players in environmental
policy over the past two presidential administrations. During the George W. Bush
Administration, coalitions of mostly Democratic AGs frequently took the EPA to court to push
back on what they viewed as the administration’s lackadaisical approach to addressing emerging
environmental issues. The AGs’ most important litigation campaigns concerned climate change,
which aimed to prod the federal government to take more aggressive steps to address greenhouse
gases in the absence of congressional or federal executive action. In 2007, a coalition of twelve
AGs, led by Massachusetts AG Tom Reilly, scored a major Supreme Court victory in the
aforementioned Massachusetts v. EPA. This case established both that the EPA could regulate

greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and rejected the reasons the EPA had offered
to explain why it had refused to regulate them. This, in turn, provided the legal authority for the
EPA to start addressing climate change through the regulatory process (Nolette 2015a).
The AGs’ involvement in this area intensified as the Obama Administration used this
legal authority to take numerous steps to regulate greenhouse gases. I focus on two aspects of the
AGs’ involvement here. The first is a major challenge to a central Obama climate change
initiative, the Clean Power Plan. The main case, West Virginia v. EPA, is emblematic of the
partisan trends and coalitions among AGs that have become entrenched during the Obama years.
Similar to the immigration case, this litigation has spurred opposing coalitions of AGs to take the
side of the federal government against their fellow states.
However, it was not just Republican AGs taking the initiative against Obama and
Democratic AG allies. Liberal AGs sought to use a different strategy – modelled in some ways
on the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s – to address the issue. Starting in early 2016, a group
of AGs launched a “AGs United for Clean Power” initiative involving investigations into energy
firms. Of particular importance was an investigation into ExxonMobil’s activities launched by
several AGs in March 2016, after several AGs claimed the company engaged in actionable fraud
by suppressing evidence of its contribution to climate change. This investigation, and the
reaction to it from opposing AGs and their allies in Congress and the private sector, highlights
the deepening relationships between AGs and those inside and outside of government.

The Clean Power Plan and Subsequent AG Challenges
Similar to immigration policy, much of the Obama-era federal action pertaining to
climate change policy was spurred not by Congress but by executive action. Beginning with EPA

rulemaking establishing that greenhouse gases endangered human health or welfare, a key
finding that set the stage for invoking many of the CAA’s provisions, the Obama
Administration’s EPA subsequently issued regulations pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles.13 The EPA also sought to expand regulation of power plants and other
major greenhouse gas emitters, taking a series of aggressive regulatory steps in the absence of
new congressional legislation on the subject. The centerpiece of these efforts was the Clean
Power Plan (CPP) announced in June 2014, which consisted of a series of rules requiring
existing electric generating utilities to reduce emissions levels to 32 percent below their 2005
levels in the next fifteen years. President Obama suggested that the CPP was “the single most
important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change” and a crucial
part of the administration’s attempts to force power plants to shift from coal to wind and solar
power (White House 2015).
Just days after Obama’s announcement of the CPP, Ohio coal mining firm Murray
Energy filed a petition in the D.C. Circuit calling for the court to declare the rules invalid.14 A
week later, West Virginia AG Patrick Morrissey and eleven other AGs filed an amicus curiae
brief supporting Murray Energy’s positon.15 What was particularly unusual about this challenge
was that it was launched before the regulations were even finalized in the Federal Register,
typically the stage at which legal challenges to new regulations begin. According to the AGs, this
early challenge was justified because the CPP’s tight deadlines for state compliance with federal
mandates meant that the states would have significant expenditures immediately.
Shortly after this challenge, both the AGs and Murray Energy filed additional complaints
in the D.C. Circuit challenging a 2010 settlement agreement signed by the EPA that had set the
stage for EPA regulation of existing power plants.16 The settlement agreement had resolved a

lawsuit initiated in 2006 by a coalition of Democratic AGs and environmental groups seeking to
force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases emitted from power plants. Under the terms of the
settlement, the EPA agreed to issue new regulations under §111(d) of the CAA, which pertains
the state-implemented pollution standards for existing power plants.17 The problem, according to
the West Virginia-led AG coalition, was that the CAA did not allow regulation under this section
if the same power plants were already regulated under §112 of the CAA, which governs
hazardous air pollutants standards. They claimed the EPA was trying to circumvent this
limitation by committing the agency to regulate under §111(d) through a binding legal agreement
with collusive AGs and environmental groups.
The D.C. Circuit eventually sided against the West Virginia coalition, ruling that it did
not have the authority to review mere proposed rules and rejecting the challenge to the 2011
settlement agreement on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge it (In re
Murray Energy Corp., Nos. 14-1112 et al. [D.C. Cir. June 9, 2015]). However, this concluded
only the first wave of litigation over the CPP. On the same day that the EPA finalized the CPP in
October 2015, a coalition of twenty-four AGs and state agencies filed a motion to stay the rules
(West Virginia, et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 [D.C. Cir., filed October 23, 2015]). Other AGs filed
separate but closely linked challenges, as did a large number of business associations, labor
groups, and utilities. The basic argument was that the states and other groups would suffer
“immediate and irreparable harm” due to the tight timeline demanded by the EPA for states to
implement the new rules. The plaintiffs argued that they were likely to prevail on the merits for
the same statutory and constitutional reasons as the parties had raised in the earlier litigation
prior to the EPA’s finalized rule.

The litigation generated numerous filings from states either challenging or supporting the
EPA, as indicated in Table 3. A counter-coalition of nineteen Democratic AGs, led by New York
AG Eric Schneiderman, intervened to support the EPA’s position. Several environmental and
industry groups also joined the EPA’s position. Members of Congress became involved in the
litigation as well, filing amicus briefs on highly polarized lines either supporting or opposing the
challenge.18

[Table 3 about here]

In a brief order in January 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied the request to stay the CPP.
However, the AGs and allied groups took the unusual step of asking the Supreme Court for a
stay, despite the fact that the lower court had not yet addressed the merits of the case. This
unusual request paid off. By a five-four vote on February 9, 2016 – only four days before Justice
Scalia died – the Supreme Court issued a stay of the program until the lower court decided the
merits. This marked the first time that the Court granted a request to halt a regulation before a
lower court had even reviewed it (Liptak and Davenport 2016).
The Supreme Court’s stay meant that the program could not be implemented until the
D.C. Circuit, and eventually the Supreme Court, resolves the merits of the dispute. The D.C.
Circuit held over seven hours of oral arguments in September 2016, and a decision on the merits
is (as of April 2017) pending. Most importantly, however, the Republican sweep in the 2016
elections offered the Trump Administration a chance to reverse the CPP through executive and
legislative actions regardless of future judicial decisions. Indeed, in March 2017 President Trump
issued an executive order directing the rollback of the CPP, and the Scott Pruitt-led EPA asked

the D.C. Circuit to delay a ruling in the case until the agency had an opportunity to respond to
Trump’s executive order (Rodriguez 2017). Given that the CPP looks likely to be reversed
during Trump’s presidency, the West Virginia-led AGs’ strategy of delaying the plan until the
subsequent administration appears to have been successful.

AGs United for Clean Power
The West Virginia v. EPA litigation was probably the most important of the AG
challenges to various EPA regulations during the Obama Administration. Yet it was not only AG
opponents of expanded climate change regulation who have acted. AGs seeking greater
regulatory steps to address climate change have employed new strategies to expand regulation by
directly targeting the utilities the AGs allege have contributed climate change.
The key effort began in March 2016 when a coalition of sixteen AGs, along with several
local officials and former Vice President Al Gore, announced the formation of “AGs United for
Clean Power.” The stated purpose of this group, which consisted mainly of the same Democratic
members of the AG coalition that had intervened to support the EPA in West Virginia v. EPA,
was to determine whether the company lied to investors and the public about the threat to climate
change and the company’s contributions to it. Among other things, the group members sought to
focus on Exxon Mobil’s funding of outside groups that challenged climate science and whether
statements made to investors about climate risks conflicted with the company’s own internal
studies (Schwartz 2016a).
The new coalition was the culmination of a four-year coordinated strategy by
environmental organizations to hold “Big Oil” legally accountable for climate change denial
(McKenna 2016). Starting in 2012, leading members from these groups had strategized about

how to best fight the energy industry in the courts in order to procure internal documents and
spur attention to the industry’s political strategies. These groups saw promise in teaming with
AGs, especially given the wide range of investigatory powers AGs have under federal and state
laws. The strategy began to come to fruition in November 2015, when New York AG Eric
Schneiderman issued a subpoena to ExxonMobil demanding four decades of documents relating
to internal company communications on climate change. Following this action, members of the
environmental organizations met with AGs early in 2016 to discuss legal strategies going
forward – a meeting that was followed shortly after by the announcement of the AGs United for
Clean Power.
This coalition’s legal strategy aimed to follow the pattern of the AGs’ tobacco litigation
in the late 1990s, a point made explicitly by Gore during the press conference announcing the
group. The tobacco litigation, which eventually involved all of the nation’s AGs, featured AGs
using their significant investigative powers to force the industry to divulge information about
what the company had known about the health risks of tobacco. Among the millions of
documents obtained during the investigation were several that implied that the industry knew
more about the dangers of smoking than the companies were admitting publically. These, in turn,
provided leverage for the AGs to settle their claims with the largest tobacco manufacturers as
part of a $206 billion global settlement in 1998 that remains the largest civil settlement in
American history. In addition to the money, the settlement contained several regulatory
provisions essentially restructuring the entire industry and limiting tobacco advertising and
lobbying (Derthick 2012).
Similarly, the AGs part of the group intended to uncover similar “smoking guns” that
could be used to eventually force ExxonMobil and other energy companies to enter regulatory

settlements. “It’s too early to say what we’re going to find,” Schneiderman said during the
announcement of the coalition, but “we intend to work as aggressively as possible” (Schwartz
2016a). The effort would include bringing to bear several laws granting AGs wide investigatory
powers, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and several
state consumer protection and deceptive business and trade practices acts. These same statutes
had played a major role in the tobacco litigation as well. The AGs argued that this effort was
necessary in light of the federal government’s failure to do more to address climate change. As
Rhode Island AG Peter Kilmartin put it, “if Washington is not going to step up and recognize the
crisis and find meaningful solutions, then it will be up to the states to do so” (New York
Attorney General 2016).
While most of the AGs attending the meeting did not reveal whether they had started any
investigations, three AGs did specify that they had opened their own investigations – California
AG Kamala Harris, Massachusetts AG Maura Healey, and U.S. Virgin Islands AG Claude
Walker. Walker’s investigation was particularly wide-ranging, as he issued subpoenas not only
to ExxonMobil but also to conservative organizations looking for evidence that the company
teamed up with ideological groups to oppose climate change (Schwartz 2016c).
The announcement of the AGs United for Clean Power group and its intentions to
conduct wider probes into the energy industry sparked a considerable backlash. ExxonMobil
filed suit against Healey and Walker, arguing that the AGs’ subpoenas violated due process as
well as the company’s free speech rights (Exxon Mobil v. Walker, No. 017-284890-16 [Dist. Ct.
Tarrant County, Tex., April 13, 2016]; Exxon Mobil v. Healey, No. 4:16-cv-00469-A [N.D. Tex.
June 15, 2016]). Soon after, eleven Republican AGs filed an amicus brief supporting
ExxonMobil’s attempt to enjoin their fellow AG’s investigation into the company. The brief

accused their colleague of “using law enforcement authority to resolve a public policy debate”
and argued that Massachusetts’ actions represented “an abuse of its subpoena powers.”19
Members of Congress also pushed back on the states’ investigations. In May 2016, the
Republican members of the U.S. House’s Committee on Science, Space, and Technology sent a
letter to Schneiderman informing him of the committee’s intention to investigate the AGs’
“coordinated attempt to deprive companies, nonprofit organizations, and scientists of their First
Amendment rights and ability to fund and conduct scientific research free from intimidation and
threats of prosecution.” The committee subpoenaed numerous documents from the AGs and
several environmental groups, including any communications the AG members had with the
environmental advocacy groups, other AGs, and representatives of federal agencies.20 This
marked the first time that a House committee had subpoenaed a state AG (Schwartz 2016d).
The AGs refused to comply with the congressional subpoenas, calling the request “a
dangerous overreach by the Committee and an affront to states' rights” (Hasemyer 2016).
Nevertheless, the legal pushback from ExxonMobil and its AG amici led to both Walker and
Healey withdrawing their subpoenas. As of this writing, the AGs’ investigations remain active,
though it remains unclear to what extent courts will allow the investigations to proceed.

Lessons of the Climate Change Battles
Regardless of the ultimate result of the CPP challenges and the AG investigations of
ExxonMobil, they both highlight several key aspects of AG activism during the latter years of
the Obama Administration. For one, AGs remain as committed as ever to the creative use of their
expansive powers – which operate largely independently from other state officials – to achieve
national public policy goals. This now firmly entrenched nationalized activism has meant that

AG strategizing about potential legal challenges is ongoing and anticipatory, rather than ad hoc
and reactive. Republican AGs were already in conversations about how to challenge the CPP
before even the proposed rules were announced, allowing near-immediate challenges to
administration policies. The plaintiff AG coalition employed something of a “kitchen sink”
approach of using various substantive and procedural arguments to delay the rules, including
taking the unusual step of challenging the EPA’s new rules at every stage before they even
became final. Likewise, the AGs United for Clean Power initiative has relied upon new
arguments based on expansive definitions of “fraud” in state investigations to advance broader
nationally-focused goals on climate change.
Unlike many previous federalism disputes in American history that have primarily
involved regional divisions, it is partisan divisions that have been most prominent in these
disputes. As with the West Virginia v. EPA litigation, Democratic and Republican AGs have
taken opposing positions on climate change mirroring the broader partisan coalitions of which
they are a part. In this way, the Obama-era legal battles over federal policies affecting federalism
simply cannot be characterized as involving “the states versus the national government.” Instead,
these battles involve sharp conflicts among the states themselves, with some challenging and
others defending the exercise of federal power. This partisanship is also apparent in the
remarkable conflict over the past year involving the investigations of ExxonMobil, in which AGs
partnered with the target of the investigation to argue against their fellow AGs’ exercise of
prosecutorial power.
The climate change battles also provide a good example of AG alliances with likeminded outside groups. The idea of employing RICO and state consumer protection statutes
against energy firms originated with environmental interest groups that later worked with the

Democratic AGs implementing the strategy in the ExxonMobil investigations. This builds upon
relationships forged between AGs and environmental group allies during the Bush and Obama
Administrations, which included Massachusetts v. EPA and various subsequent efforts to force
the federal government to address climate change. Meanwhile, Republican AGs worked with
industry groups to defend against stricter pollution regulations, joining with ExxonMobil against
their fellow AGs’ investigations and coordinating legal strategies with Murray Energy in the
parallel CPP challenges.
Throughout these battles, both sides have used evidence of these AG-outside group
collaborations as a basis to attack the opposing side. The collaborations between environmental
groups and AGs sparked the congressional investigation into AGs United for Clean Power.
Similarly, Republican AGs pointed to “collusive” settlements between liberal AGs,
environmental groups, and the EPA as evidence of a “sue-and-settle” strategy meant to operate
as an end-run around Congress and the regulatory process (Monies 2013). Democratic AGs
demanded that Republican AGs reveal their connections with industry groups during the West
Virginia v. EPA litigation, and pointed out that Murray Energy had donated $250,000 to the
Republican Attorneys General Association shortly before the litigation began (Dlouhy 2016).
The increasing partisanship among AGs has occurred amidst the broader polarization
throughout the Obama years. AG challenges to Obama Administration policies represented an
opportunity for a broader national Republican coalition to stop regulatory initiatives – something
the Republican Congress could not accomplish legislatively because of President Obama’s veto
power. In much the same way, Democratic AG-led initiatives such as the AGs United for Clean
Power were attempts to advance the goals of a broader partisan coalition without the necessity of
involving Congress.

COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION IN AG ACTIVITY
As important as these deepening partisan and ideological trends have been, AGs have
continued to find common ground in much of their work. For one, Democratic and Republican
AGs continue to work closely on criminal law issues, frequently appearing on bipartisan amicus
briefs in federal court (Nolette 2014). Additionally, AGs have continued bipartisan enforcement
efforts to fight alleged corporate fraud affecting multiple states – efforts frequently resulting in
multistate settlements involving all or nearly all the nation’s AGs (Yelkin 2007). Particularly
important have been a series of multistate settlements with pharmaceutical companies targeting
alleged fraud that have served to reform the industry’s drug pricing and advertising nationwide
(Nolette 2015b). Additionally, the federal government has sought more integrated federal-state
enforcement efforts to achieve shared priorities, particularly concerning criminal law
enforcement and anti-fraud initiatives. AGs have been the beneficiaries of increased enforcement
capabilities and federal funding dating to the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and
establishment of the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units in 1978. Information
sharing between the Department of Justice, other federal enforcement agencies, and the AGs has
been a feature of cooperative enforcement efforts for decades.
Nevertheless, the AGs’ relationship with federal enforcement agencies was frequently
rocky during the George W. Bush years. Agencies such as the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency sought to preempt AGs’ role in corporate investigations, federal funding for state
enforcement efforts faced cuts, and previously active federal-state working groups received
lessened priority (National Association of Attorneys General 2009). As soon as Obama entered
office, the National Association of Attorneys General urged the administration to establish a

stronger relationship between the federal DOJ and state AGs (National Association of Attorneys
General 2009).

Recent Trends Towards Greater Cooperation in AG Activities
The Obama Administration responded by expanding cooperative state-federal
enforcement efforts in several ways. Several of the earliest major Obama legislative initiatives,
including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as well as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, deputized AGs to enforce new federal laws. Federal
funding for AG enforcement efforts, such as through Byrne Justice Assistance Grants, expanded
dramatically in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (McKay 2009). The
Department of Justice and other key federal enforcement agencies drew heavily from the ranks
of state-level enforcement personnel, likely contributing to the state-friendly attitude within these
federal agencies.
The improved federal-state relationships were perhaps most apparent with the
proliferation of multiagency task forces and working groups involving federal and state law
enforcement personnel working together to address similar problems. Across a range of
enforcement issues – from payday lending, to antitrust enforcement, to mortgage fraud – these
initiatives have made AGs crucial partners in advancing national enforcement priorities.
The central effort was the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force established by
President Obama’s executive order in November 2009. The Task Force aimed “to wage
aggressive and coordinated investigations and prosecutions of financial frauds and maximize the
ability both to recover the proceeds of these frauds and obtain just and effective punishment of
those who commit them” (Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force n.d.). Since its creation,

several interagency working groups have been housed under the broader Task Force, including
groups pertaining to loan fraud, securities and commodity fraud, and financial institution fraud.
In addition to the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, the Department of Justice worked
closely with AGs on various additional task forces ranging from intellectual property issues to
antitrust enforcement. Throughout the past several years, the AGs’ involvement in these
collaborative efforts has been largely bipartisan.
The multiagency taskforce activity has resulted in considerable enforcement activity. In
some cases, the close cooperation and information-sharing among federal-state enforcers has
resulted in several separate but closely related settlements with individual targeted firms. For
example, the DOJ and AGs worked together to investigate government claims that Volkswagen
cheated emissions tests and deceived consumers, which ultimately resulted in closely linked
federal and state settlements with the company in June 2016 (U.S. Department of Justice 2016).
In others, these efforts have resulted in a single federal-state settlement with the corporate targets
of the investigations. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, for example, concluded a
$26 billion joint federal-state settlement in 2012 between several federal agencies, forty-nine
AGs, and the five largest mortgage servicers in the country. In addition to the monetary
provisions, the settlement contained several new regulatory code-of-conduct provisions requiring
substantial changes to how the servicers do business. These provisions achieved regulatory goals
without congressional action or proceeding through the typical regulatory process (U.S.
Department of Justice 2012).
The AGs’ close and largely bipartisan cooperation with the Obama Administration’s
enforcement efforts contrasts with the simultaneous and contentious AG pushback on numerous
Obama Administration initiatives. I now turn to a case study that helps illustrate the cooperative

side of the relationship: coordinated efforts to investigate the for-profit higher education
industry. While just one of many similarly collaborative federal-state efforts, I focus on the forprofit education sector in part because these efforts have received less attention than the more
high-profile efforts involving the financial sector after the Great Recession and because of the
sheer effect that this litigation had on a major national industry. What had been a rapidly
growing sector was, after AG investigations and Obama Administration actions, a much
diminished and besieged one. Additionally, like the tobacco litigation and mortgage litigation
mentioned earlier, this litigation illustrates that AGs have increasingly taken advantage of not
only federalism as a veto point to block policy, but as an opportunity point advancing policy
goals in the absence of new congressional legislation. In this case, AGs partnered with
likeminded members of the federal executive branch to build on each other’s efforts and place
additional regulatory pressure on the industry.

Cooperative Federalism in Action: Oversight of the For-Profit Higher Education Industry
Most colleges and universities in the United States have historically been non-profit
institutions. The for-profit model grew rapidly beginning in the 1970s, however, following an
amendment to the Higher Education Act allowing for-profit institutions access to federal funds
(including grants and student loans). Institutions such as the University of Phoenix, DeVry
University, ITT Tech, and several others gained thousands of students during the rapid growth of
the industry in the decades since. By 2007, the Department of Education stated that the number
of for-profit colleges and universities has grown to over 1,000 institutions, and in 2009
enrollment in these institutions reached its peak (Lederman 2010). The University of Phoenix,
claiming some 300,000 students nationwide, became the largest private university in America.

Despite this rapid growth, however, the high percentage of student defaults and low
graduation rates led to increased federal scrutiny of the industry as early as the 1980s. But it was
a pair of key federal government reports that provided additional attention to the industry and
escalated the industry’s legal problems. A 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) suggested that students at for-profit schools had particularly low graduation rates yet
were left with very high debt levels (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009). Another
GAO report the following year found evidence of deceptive tactics and fraud at several for-profit
colleges. The report, which followed an undercover sting involving investigators posing as
students interested in enrolling in for-profit colleges, detailed how several colleges encouraged
students to provide false information on student loan applications. The report also found that
school officials at fifteen for-profit institutions had also provided misleading information about
the programs’ costs and the employment prospects for students graduating from the programs
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010).
Significant subsequent revisions to the GAO report softened several of its harshest
evaluations of the industry, leading to criticism of the GAO by Republican members of Congress
and to a lawsuit by a for-profit education industry group (Weinberger 2011). Nevertheless, the
report sparked additional oversight of the industry from several quarters. The GAO’s report was
followed up by a two-year investigation led by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) that highlighted
various problems in the industry (U.S. Senate HELP Committee 2012). Meanwhile, the
Department of Education proposed new regulations, referred to as “gainful employment” rules,
which would cut off federal funding to for-profit colleges whose graduates did not earn enough
to repay their loans (Epstein 2010).

AGs’ Involvement and the Taskforce on For-Profit Education
In addition to sparking additional activity from congressional committees and federal
agencies, the GAO’s findings sparked a series of new investigations, including several led by
AGs. Several individual AGs had been involved in investigations of for-profit colleges as early
as the mid-2000s, spurred in part by the AGs’ concerns that federal agencies were not making
progress in developing stronger oversight of the industry (Dillon 2007). With the GAO report
and increasing federal activity in this area, the AGs’ investigations quickly expanded. The
Florida AG’s office opened up a major investigation of eight for-profit colleges shortly after the
release of the GAO report, and the New York Attorney General started investigating institutions
that had been found by GAO to have deceptive recruiting tactics. Other AGs soon followed with
their own independent investigations, several of which led to multi-million dollar settlements
from 2011 to 2013.
The major AG probe of the industry began in January 2014, when a dozen AGs
collectively served a series of subpoenas and civil investigative demands on four major for-profit
schools. These actions were part of a larger bipartisan coalition of thirty-two AGs investigating
the industry, led by Kentucky AG Jack Conway. The investigation was predicated on the theory
that the for-profit schools had violated several state consumer protection statutes through the
types of behavior uncovered by the GAO and the Harkin probe. These investigations occurred
alongside enforcement actions by the newly-created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission against the same schools in the AG
investigations. At the time, Conway suggested that he expected AG collaboration with federal
agencies to increase in the coming months (Armor and Zibel 2014).

This collaboration came to fruition in October of 2014, when the Department of
Education announced the creation of a new interagency taskforce on for-profit education. The
taskforce, which included as members several federal agencies as well as AGs, sought to
formalize a working group that had (among other things) launched the investigations earlier in
the year. According to the DOE, the task force’s purpose would allow members to “leverage
their resources and expertise to assist one another, thereby making the best use of scarce
resources and better protecting the interests of students and taxpayers” (U.S. Department of
Education 2014). This collaboration strengthened further in 2016 when the Federal Trade
Commission stated that it would take additional consumer protection enforcement measures
alongside AGs.
Since its creation, the interagency taskforce has taken various actions against several forprofit schools and in a relatively short time placed the entire industry on life support. Some of the
actions occurred independently but parallel to one another, with federal agencies and AGs
sharing information leading to subpoenas and subsequent lawsuits against the same institutions.
Other actions have resulted in single, coordinated federal-state settlements conducted in a similar
fashion to the settlements achieved by the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
For example, a November 2015 settlement with Education Management Corporation
(EDMC) involving the federal government and thirty-nine AGs resolved a variety of claims
against the company. These claims included state consumer protection claims as well as under
the federal False Claims Act, which allows the government to recover funds from private entities
who used fraud to obtain public money. The settlement included a $95 million fine paid to the
government and $102 million worth of debt relief to affected students, but the settlement’s most
important contributions were in its conduct terms. The terms, which read like agency regulations,

required the company to provide students additional disclosures, orientation programs, and
opportunities to withdraw from programs free of charge. It also created a new industry monitor
that would oversee the company’s compliance with the settlement terms (U.S. Department of
Justice 2015). While only applicable to EDMC, the taskforce members stated that they hoped
these terms would serve as a code of conduct for other members of the industry – including the
many that remained potential targets of the AGs and the broader taskforce.

Interagency Enforcement and the Cooperative Extension of the Regulatory State
The progression of coordinated legal attacks on the for-profit higher education industry
illustrates a different and more cooperative version of AG activism during the Obama
Administration. In this case, investigations by the federal GAO and Congress provided
momentum for AGs to pursue state-level probes themselves, which in turn helped feed further
investigations by federal enforcement agencies. Eventually, the relationships between the federal
government (the DOJ, CFPB, and other agencies) and the AGs strengthened as their
investigations and settlements became explicitly cooperative.
As with other interagency task forces, particularly the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force, the resolution of investigations sought to achieve policy and regulatory changes in an
industry in the face of perceived congressional inaction. Advocates for industry reform pressed
Congress to curb alleged abuses, particularly after the initial GAO report, but little legislative
action was forthcoming. The response was to employ enforcement actions to achieve quasiregulatory settlements that sought to establish the new codes of conduct Congress would not.
This cooperative activity has tended to attract more bipartisan support. Most of the
nation’s AGs, both Democrats and Republicans, were involved in the federal/state investigations

into the for-profit education sector. That said, these efforts have received some criticism for
potentially exceeding executive power at the expense of Congress. As the interagency taskforce
on for-profit education became more active, for example, several Republican U.S. Senators sent
a letter to the DOE Secretary skeptically probing the purposes of and statutory authority for the
task force.21 The taskforce’s formation, after all, occurred amidst failures to enact the Proprietary
Education Oversight Coordination Improvement Act (also supported by many AGs), which
would have explicitly allowed interagency oversight of the for-profit education industry. As
“informal” coordination, by contrast, the taskforce did not have similar legislative authority.
Nevertheless, the initiative continued to generate bipartisan enforcement actions throughout the
remainder of the Obama presidency.
As with many other policy areas, it remains to be seen how the Trump Administration
will handle allegations of fraud by for-profit educational institutions. Many observers believed a
significant policy shift would occur, particularly given that Trump’s own for-profit university
was the target of an AG investigation that settled for $25 million shortly after the 2016 election,
and his Education Secretary, Betsy DeVos, has been an advocate for private educational
institutions. Yet the Trump Administration also defended stricter Obama-era regulations in court
against an industry challenge, suggesting that the administration will abide by at least some of
the new regulatory accomplishments during the previous administration (Bloomberg News
2017).
Regardless of what the federal government does, the cooperation among AGs on this
issue continues as well. Several of the AGs involved in the Obama-era for-profit education
probes vowed to continue their investigations with or without the federal government. Just days
after President Trump entered office, for example, AGs sought to intervene in a federal case

against a major for-profit college accreditor. The timing was not coincidental; in the words of
one education policy observer, “the intervention serves as a form of insurance” in case the
Trump Administration attempted to drop the lawsuit (Waldman 2017).

CONCLUSION
Both the conflictual and cooperative elements of AG activity during Obama’s presidency
contributed to the entrenchment of AGs’ roles in national policy. Republican AGs established
mechanisms of coordination amongst themselves to find new ways of challenging Obama’s
policies. This in turn spurred the creation of Democratic AG coalitions that supported the
administration and sought innovative ways to use their powers of investigation to achieve liberal
policy goals. The AGs’ more cooperative relationships with the federal government also served
to bolster AG power. The Obama Administration invited AGs to work with executive officials as
part of several interagency taskforces, in the process forging strong and continuous relationships
between federal and state law enforcement. In addition to both sides generating and sharing
information about potential enforcement actions, AGs and federal agencies built on the each
other’s efforts to place additional pressure on national industries to change their practices.
Negotiated settlements between federal agencies, AGs, and leading members of industry
established new regulatory baselines and codes of conduct across national industries – even as
congressional efforts to address alleged abuses in economic sectors such as mortgage lending
and for-profit higher education stalled.
With a Trump Administration pursuing very different goals alongside unified Republican
governance on the federal level, it remains to be seen how the relationships between AGs and the
federal government will evolve. However, several of the trends emerging during the Obama

years appear likely to continue. Indeed, the AGs’ entrenched role as a veto point frustrating
administration policies paid dividends for Democratic AGs even in the early weeks of Trump’s
presidency. Very shortly after Trump announced new immigration limits via executive order,
several AGs successfully enjoined the actions in court (Associated Press 2017). Furthermore,
much like their Republican counterparts during the Obama years, Democratic AGs are preparing
to battle the Trump Administration on a variety of anticipated policy changes (Burns 2017). As
Xavier Becerra, who relinquished a top leadership position in Congress for the chance to become
California’s AG, remarked in reference to challenging President Trump in court: “I see it as a
team sport” (Hart 2017).
AGs are likely to continue seeking additional ways of expanding their authority to
achieve their policy goals. Democratic AGs partnered with legal actors in increasingly
Democratic cities to challenge Trump’s immigration orders, and have vowed to partner with
them again if the president acts to cut federal funding as retaliation for localities refusing to
enforce federal immigration laws (The Economist 2017). AGs have also used the expansive
interpretations of state standing developed in Republican challenges to Obama’s policies to
challenge Trump’s executive orders.22 Meanwhile, one Democratic state legislature (Maryland)
enacted legislation providing its Democratic AG expanded powers to circumvent the Republican
governor in order to sue Trump – the first time Maryland had expanded its AG’s power since
1864 (Cox 2017).
This sort of ideological conflict among the AGs and other institutions is likely to continue
and perhaps strengthen further, reflecting both the trends among AGs and the broader American
political system. The last year of the Obama presidency, for example, witnessed an
unprecedented effort by Republican AGs – along with fellow Republicans in Congress – to

challenge Democratic AGs’ authority to conduct their own in-state (but coordinated)
investigations of ExxonMobil. While individual AGs have occasionally criticized allegedly
overzealous investigations by AGs of the other party, AGs’ active intervention in litigation
opposing their fellow AGs’ state-level investigations is a new development.
The sharpening polarization of AG activism has also been reflected in partisan conflicts
between AGs and other state-level officials. During the Obama Administration, governors and
AGs of the opposite party clashed frequently. Republican governors claimed the authority to
represent the state in litigation challenging federal law when Democratic AGs refused to do so,
over objections that the AG has the sole authority to represent the state in court (Baltz 2015).
Several Democratic AGs took the unusual position of refusing to defend challenges to their own
state’s laws in the context of same-sex marriage and controversial transgender bathroom bills,
spurring in-state Republicans to seek their own legal counsel to take up the defense (e.g., Blythe
2016). Even more recently, Republican Texas AG provided another example of intra-state
conflict by joining lawsuits challenging policies adopted by Texas cities under Democratic
control, and Maine’s Democratic AG sued the Republican governor for violating the state’s open
meetings law (Formby 2016; Thistle 2016).
The emergence of new avenues of partisan conflict is due not only to the continuing
polarization in American society generally, but is also a consequence of the strengthening
collaborations between AGs and like-minded ideological allies outside of government. Several of
the Republican-led challenges to Obama Administration policies received strategic and financial
support from conservative and industry groups, and Democratic AGs have continued to
coordinate with liberal groups on litigation strategies. Meanwhile, the respective Republican and
Democratic AG Associations have become major lobbying targets, including by business entities

subject to possible investigations and private class-action attorneys looking to partner with AGs
on lawsuits (Lipton 2014).
While there are few signs that the polarized AG activism of the Obama years will
disappear during the Trump presidency, it is unclear whether and how federal executives in the
next administration will work cooperatively with AGs to address common concerns. The Obama
Administration took particular care to include AGs in interagency enforcement taskforces, in part
to strengthen the prospects that the regulatory provisions of global federal-state settlements
would stick. However, the combination of unified Republican government and a more
deregulatory outlook on the part of federal agencies during the Trump Administration may lessen
the commitment to this form of cooperation as a method of industry oversight. Even so, AGs and
the federal DOJ may find areas to work collaboratively on some enforcement issues, much as
they did despite often testy relationships during the conservative George W. Bush
Administration – including, importantly, on joint federal-state efforts to tackle issues of crime,
drugs, and Medicaid fraud. During his first address to the National Association of Attorneys
General, for example, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a new Task Force on Crime
Reduction and Public Safety that would work collaboratively with AGs (U.S. Department of
Justice 2017).
Regardless of how the balance of contention and cooperation among AGs and the federal
government shapes up in the coming years, it is safe to say that AGs will not easily concede the
considerable influence on the national stage that they have built up over the past two presidential
administrations. President Trump, like Obama and Bush before him, will need to contend with
the growing national activism of these important state-level officials.
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